The Malthusian theory of evolution disregards a pervasive fact about human societies: they expand through conict. When this is taken account of the long-run favors not a large population at the level of subsistence, nor yet institutions that maximize welfare or per capita output, but rather institutions that maximize free resources. These free resources are the output available to society after deducting the payments necessary for subsistence and for the incentives needed to induce production, and the other claims to production such as transfer payments and resources absorbed by elites. We develop the evolutionary underpinnings of this model, and examine the implications of free resource maximization for the evolution of societies in several applications. Since free resources are increasing both in per capita income and population, evolution will favor large rich societies. We will show how technological improvement is likely to increase per capita output as well as increase population, and how economically inecient institutions such as bureaucracy arise. JEL Classication Numbers: D74 (Conict Resolution), C73 (Evolutionary Games), O15 (Human Development, Migrations), D02 (Institutions)
There are some men, even in the highest rank, who are prevented from marrying by the idea of the expenses that they must retrench Malthus [51] The overall goal of this paper is to establish a theoretical setting of interacting societies in which it is conict that determines long run success or failure. We identify assumptions under which the strongest society wins in the long-run, and examine the limitations and subtle implications of these assumptions. What will matter is willingness to expand and total resources which can be devoted to expansion -hence size matters. We attempt to build the theoretical setting in a way that can easily be applied to study practical problems of particular societies both contemporary and historical in order to understand which institutions are likely to be persistent. To illustrate this we examine several simple applications.
A key idea of the paper is that conict resolution depends not only on the ability of players to inuence their neighbors, but also on their desire to do so. Our main conclusion that with a single dimensional measure of strength the strongest society will be observed most of the time over the long run is rather intuitive. However, as those familiar with the evolutionary literature will appreciate, to actually establish such a result in a clean form is not trivial. Moreover, not all implications of our assumptions are so obvious as the fact that the strongest society wins. Indeed, strictly speaking, the strongest society does not win. Rather it is the strongest incentive compatible arrangement that matters -non-Nash equilibria stand no chance in the long run, no matter how strong they might be. Second, it is not the strongest Nash equilibrium that wins. Societies can dier in their attitudes towards inuencing neighbors. Societies, no matter how strong, that do not attempt to expand aggressively also will not survive in the long run. Rather it is the strongest incentive compatible and expansionary society that wins. Another point that is subtle is that expansionary attitudes are not important from the perspective of imposing particular institutions on neighbors -in fact the actual work of disrupting societies in the theory as well as in reality are by barbarian hordes -aggressive, powerful groups that however do not have especially durable institutions. Alexander the Great comes to mind in this context. Rather the importance of an aggressive expansionary posture is that when invaders achieve some success by conquering land the outward looking society aggressively attempt to recover the lost land, thus preventing gradual whittling away of territory.
The other key notion of the paper is the scalar measure of the ability of a society to disrupt neighbors or avoid disruption. We refer to this as free resources meaning resources that are not being used for purposes that make them unavailable for attack or defense. The idea is best illustrated through a simple example. We are all familiar with the caricature of the Malthusian theory of population: population grows until it is checked by disease and starvation. In the long-run we are all at the boundary of subsistence, on the margin between life and death. And while we may seem to have escaped for a time, perhaps ultimately the rapidly growing developing countries will overwhelm the gradually shrinking rich developed world and sink us all back into misery. Malthus was more subtle in his thinking than this caricature: while he wrote of positive checks on population such as disease and starvation, he also wrote of preventative checks such as delayed marriage. Now let us take into account that societies do interact, and imagine two societies side by side.
One is a society of unchecked breeders, of subsistence farmers living on the edge of starvation, their population limited only by the lack of any additional food to feed extra hungry mouths. Next door is a society with high property requirements for marriage and strong penalties for out-of-wedlock birth -a social arrangement quite common in history. This non-Malthusian society naturally has output well in excess of subsistence. Both social arrangements are is incentive compatible. Who will dominate in the long-run? What happens when a disciplined and rich society turns its covetous eye towards the land of their more numerous but poorer neighbors?
How indeed are the wretched poor -for whom to take even an hour away from toil in the elds is to starve -to be able to defend themselves from well-fed and well-armed intruders? The question answers itself. In this view free resources are the output available to society after the payments necessary for subsistence and for the incentives needed to induce production are made and after other claims such as transfer payments and resources absorbed by elites are paid.
We explore the consequences of free resource maximization in a series of examples. In the Malthusian model the theory gives a positive theory of population size: as long as there are incentive compatible institutions that control population growth, the equilibrium population is the one that maximizes total free resources. This is inconsistent with growing so large as to reach subsistence, as such a society generates no free resources. It is equally inconsistent with maximizing per capita output, since this requires a very tiny society that generates many free resources per person, but very few in total.
3 Rather the long-run population is at an intermediate level, greater than that which maximizes per capita income, but less than subsistence.
We then examine the impact of technological change in a population setting and uncover very non-Malthusian results. Malthus predicts that the benets of technological change will in the long-run be dissipated entirely in increased population with no increase in per capita output, which remains at subsistence. When there is relatively strong diminishing returns on plots of land, maximization of free resources implies that improved technology results primarily in increased per capita output. However, depending on the underlying returns to population size, technological change can also result in diminished per capita output in some parameter range. The Malthusian case of per capita output independent of technology will only occur as a non-generic accident. For simple and plausible cases, continued technological improvement rst lowers then raises per capita output. This theory is very much more in accord with the evidence than Malthusian theory.
4
Maximization of free resources leads more broadly to a positive theory of the State: it has implications for institutions other than those that govern population size. It does not imply, as does, for example, the theory of Ely, economic eciency.
5
Ely [34] shows that if institutions spread through voluntary migration people will move to the more ecient locations and that in the long run this favors ecient institutions over inecient ones. But we do not believe that historically people have generally moved from one location to another through a kind of voluntary immigration into the arms of welcoming neighbors. Rather people and institutions have more often spread through invasion -most often in the form of physical conquest, but also through means such as proselytizers and missionaries, or just exploration This theory of population size of a given geographical extent should be compared to the theory of Alesina and Spolaore [6] who examine the optimal geographical extent of a nation. 5 Ely uses a model similar to the one used here, but similar results using more biologically oriented models have been around for some time. For example Aoki [1] uses a migration model to study eciency, while more recently Rogers, Deshpande and Feldman [57] use a migration model to show how unequal resources can lead to long-run inequality. 4 of new territory. In a setting of moral hazard, we show how maximization of free resources can indeed lead to ineciently low levels of output (Section 6). 6 We also use the example to explore in greater detail how individual choices can result in free resources or not.
Our nal example examines a simple model of a bureaucratic State in a setting of hidden endowments. (Section 7) Here bureaucrats serve as specialists in converting resources that individuals might prefer to consume into free resources. We nd that when bureaucrats are relatively ineective free resource maximization leads to a non-bureaucratic and ecient state. As bureaucrats become more eective their number jumps up, and then with further increases in eectiveness it declines.
Hence a free resource maximizing highly ineective or eective bureaucracy leads to relative eciency, while intermediate degrees of bureaucracy eectiveness lead to a higher degree of ineciency.
The technical approach we take is the evolutionary one pioneered by Kandori, Mailath and Rob [46] and Young [61] . Like the earlier literature we suppose that people adjust relatively rapidly to new circumstances. In that literature this was represented by what is often called the deterministic dynamics which is generally a variation on the best-response or replicator dynamic. Those deterministic dynamics suppose an adjustment process towards individually optimal strategies, and if they converge generally speaking the incentive constraints are satised and the point of convergence is a Nash equilibrium. However, as a reader of that literature might be aware, these dynamics are badly behaved in many games, and the earlier evolutionary literature focused on particular limited classes of games such as coordination games in which the deterministic dynamic is particularly well behaved. We do not think the misbehavior of the deterministic dynamic is especially interesting as people seem in fact to rapidly reach Nash equilibrium, and, as pointed out, for example, in Fudenberg and Levine [37] , the behavior of these dynamics when they do not converge is not especially plausible. As underlying model of rational individual behavior we take not these deterministic dynamics, but rather a simplied version of the stochastic dynamics developed more recently by [Foster and Young] . This gives global convergence, at least in the stochastic sense, and enables us to give 6 There are many other channels through which evolution can lead to ineciency. For examples Bowles [19] discusses how ineciency can arise in a Kandori, Mailath and Rob [46] and Young [61] type of setting with groups when they are of dierent sizes or have dierent memory lengths.
clean theorems without limiting attention to particular classes of games.
While the earlier literature supposed that the deterministic dynamic was perturbed by random mutations, we take the view that these small random changes -disruptions to existing arrangements if you like -are inuenced instead by the relative strength of societies. Our strongest assumption is that this strength is measured by a single scalar quantity. We also assume that initially a tiny invading society has a negligible chance of disrupting existing social arrangement, but that once it becomes comparable in size to the pre-existing society the chances it is able to further disrupt the status quo becomes appreciable. Our approach is a variation on the conict resolution function introduced by Hirshleifer [43] and subsequently studied in the economic literature on conict.
7
The idea that evolution can lead to both cooperation and ineciency is scarcely new, nor is the idea that evolutionary pressure may be driven by conict. There is a long literature on group selection in evolution: there may be positive assortative matching as discussed by Bergstrom [10] . Or there can be noise that leads to a trade-o between incentive constraints and group welfare as in the work of Price [54, 55] . Yet another approach is through dierential extinction as in Boorman and Levitt [17] . Conict, as opposed to migration, as a source of evolutionary pressure is examined in Bowles [20] , who shows how intergroup competition can lead to the evolution of altruism. Bowles, Choi and Hopfensitz [24] and ? ] study in group altruism versus out group hostility in a model driven by conict . Rowthorn and Seabright [58] explain a drop in welfare during the neolithic transition as arising from the greater diculty of defending agricultural resources.
More broadly, there is a great deal of work on the evolution of preferences as well as of institutions: for example Blume and Easley [13] , Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya [29] , Alger and Weibull [7] , Levine et al [48] or Bottazzi and Dindo [18] . Some of this work is focused more on biological evolution than social evolution. As Bisin [11] and Bisin and Topa [12] point out the two are not the same. This paper is driven by somewhat dierent goals than earlier work. We are interested in an environment that can encompass relatively general games and strategy spaces; in an environment where individual incentives matter a great deal; and in 7 See, for example, Garnkel and Skaperdas [40] or Hausken [42] . An important focus of this literature has been in guring out how shares [which shares?] are determined by conict resolution function. 6 an environment where the selection between the resulting equilibria are driven by conict over resources (land) . By employing the stochastic tools of by Kandori, Mailath and Rob [46] and Young [61] we are able with relatively weak assumptions to characterize stochastically stable states -the typical states of the system -as those among the incentive compatible states that feature large societies maximizing free resources.
The Economic Environment
Time lasts forever t = 1, . . . Players care only about the actions taken by players living in the current period -they are myopic, which is to say we assume that periods are long enough to encompass the horizon of the players -and they care only about actions taken on the same plot of land on which they reside. Preferences of player i are described by a utility function u i (a j t ). We refer to the game on a particular plot of land induced by these utility functions during a particular period as the stage game.
Of particular interest on each plot are the (pure) Nash equilibria of the stage game. These are the proles a j t such that a ij t is a best-response to a −ij t for all j. There is of course no guarantee that pure strategy equilibria exist. However, as is standard, we may introduce a nite grid of mixed strategies and by doing so guarantee the existence of approximate equilibria. We can then weaken the behavioral assumption below so that approximate equilibria are absorbing or we may perturb payos a small amount to get exact equilibria. In this sense existence is not an important conceptual problem, and indeed we are interested not in the case where existence may be problematic, but the case, such as in repeated or social norm games, where there are many, many equilibria. To avoid any technical issue, we will subsequently assume existence.
Plots of land do interact with each other, but only through conict. Interactions between plots, as well as behavior, are probabilistic and some consequences have negligible and other appreciable probability. To formalize this we introduce a a noise parameter ≥ 0. Subsequently we will be considering limits as → 0. Following 7 the standard terminology of evolutionary theory, such as Young [61] Notice that a lower probability in the sense of a more rapid decrease as → 0 means a higher resistance; by an appreciable probability we mean a resistance of zero. Otherwise we say that the probability is negligible.
Conict is resolved through a conict resolution function. Formally, depending on players play on the various plots, there is a possibility each period t that a single plot of land k is disrupted to an action prole a j t+1 ∈ A the following period. This disruption may have the form of conquest, that is the new prole that k is forced to play may be the same as that of a conqueror j, but it is a more general concept: for example, the result of conquest may not be that the conquered adopt the customs of the conquerors, but rather than the conquered fall into anarchy. Let a t = (a j t ) j=1,...J denote the prole of actions over players and plots. The probability that plot k is disrupted to action a j t+1 (which it will play at t + 1) is given by the conict resolution function π k (a j t+1 , a t )[ ] ≥ 0 where since at most one plot can be disrupted
We assume that this inequality is strict, so that there is a strictly positive probability that no disruption occurs, and that π k (a j t+1 , a t )[ ] > 0 for all j when > 0. Notice in particular that the conict resolution function depends on the noise parameter and in particular admits negligible probabilities.
Histories and Player Behavior
The behavior of players depends on the history of past events as well as their incentives. Let H denote the set of L-length sequences of action proles in all plots.
At the beginning of a period the state is
that is a list of what has happened on each plot for the previous L ≥ 2 periods 
Notice that in a noisy state the probability of change is appreciable because it is positive and does not depend upon . This means that in a noisy state change is quite rapid until a quiet state is reached again. This will have the implication that Nash equilibrium is reached relatively rapidly following a disruption. This assumption captures the idea that even in changing times, while society as a whole may be disrupted, people manage to accommodate themselves to new circumstances and achieve incentive compatibility relatively quickly. For example, refugees during time of war may be quite miserable, but never-the-less generally seem to adjust in a sensible way to their new constraints. Similarly in prisoner of war camps, people seem to quickly adjust develop new stable institutions with a well organized hierarchy and trade -for example using cigarettes as currency. Denition 2. A state s t is a Nash state if every plot of land is in a Nash equilibrium and it is quiet for every player in every plot.
Notice that if a state is Nash then all plots are quiet, and hence unless there is a disruption, the next state will be the same as the current state. On the other hand a disrupted plot begins a possibly long epoch of turmoil which however, with positive 9 probability, will end with the plot entering an existing society, which will then be strengthened. The process of evolution of societies is thus viewed as more exible and general than a military conquest followed by submission of a loser. Societies are introduced formally in the next section. Remark 1. This dynamic is a simplied version of Foster and Young [35] -it is a simple and relatively plausible model. It has the implication that in the absence of conict each plot will be absorbed in some Nash equilibrium, and that all of these equilibria have some chance of occurring.
Societies and Conict
We now wish to examine the conict resolution function in greater detail. The central idea of the paper is that conict resolution depends in an important way on two things: the ability of players to expand and their desire to do so.
The ability to expand depends on size: a prospective invader would nd it much easier to conquer, say, Singapore, than, for example, Shanghai. The reason is that China, while per capita a poorer society than Singapore, has a much larger and more capable military. In other words, plots of land are organized into larger societies, and the ability of a society to defend itself -or to conquer other societies -depends at least in part on the aggregate resources of that society, not merely the resources of individual plots of land. To capture this idea we must specify how plots of land aggregate into larger societies. Since we require that behavior on a plot of land be governed by individual choices on the plot we want to assume that aggregation choice depends on the chosen prole. The question arises as how the desires of dierent plots are reconciled.
There are many complicated possibilities for plots to form alliances: one plot playing a j t = A may be willing to ally only with plots playing B, while a plot playing B may be willing to ally with either A or C. As our goal is not to understand the details of coalition formation we simply assume that proles are partitioned into societies, with the members of an element of the partition agreeing that they are willing to ally themselves with any other prole in the same subset. Formally we assign each action prole a j t an integer value χ(a j t ) indicating which society that prole wishes to belong to, with the convention that χ(a j t ) = 0 indicates an unwillingness to belong to any larger society. All plots j with a common non-zero value x of χ(a j t ) then belong to the corresponding society, which will then represented by that integer x.
Notice that implicitly this requires that if a plot is willing to ally itself, it is willing to ally itself with plots using an identical action prole. Moreover, a plot that changes its prole may by doing so change societies. In the context of anonymous plots that are dierentiated only by the action proles of the individuals on those plots this seems a sensible simplifying assumption. Moreover, from the broad perspective of social behavior it makes sense the alliances are associated with similarity of culture: for example is it widely thought that the EU intervened in the Yugoslavian civil war because Yugoslavia is a Western country while not intervening in various African civil wars because of a lack of anity with those countries.
Similarly Islamic countries will generally support one another in conicts with nonIslamic nations such as the conict between Israel and Palestine. However, we do not rule out multiculturalism, that is, a plot may agree to be allied in a single society with other plots that use dierent prole -the European Union springs to mind as an example of such a society. We discuss aggregation map χ in more detail in section 5.
Societies not only vary in size, but are also dierentiated also by their inclination to export their ideas and social norms. Regardless of the form of expansion, expansionary institutions are not universal -an insular society is not likely to expand. for those societies that are expansionary, and negative values for those that are not.
Since we are interested in settings with many Nash equilibria, we assume that at least one Nash equilibrium is in fact expansionary: Assumption 2. There is at least one stage game Nash equilibrium which is expansionary, that is has χ(a j t ) > 0. 9 Note that whether or not a society is expansionary plays no role in the determination of Nash
Conict Resolution and Free Resources
We now come back to the ability to expand aspect mentioned above and introduce the notion of free resources as a measure of ability to expand. We begin by describing how the organization of plots into societies and the actions taken on those plots results in the disruption of plots of land through conict between dierent societies. This was represented formally by the conict resolution function, now described in greater detail.
First we dene the probability of society x being disrupted, denoted by Π(x, a t )[ ],
as the probability that one of its plots is disrupted to an alternative action. Note the parameter. In the case x = 0 this is given by
and for an isolated society playing a k t by
We make the technical assumption that the disruption function Π(x, a t )[ ] is regular and that resistance is bounded above. Without loss of generality we may take the upper bound on resistance to be one so that r[Π(x, a t )] ≤ 1.
As we said, the ability to expand depends not only on the desire to do so, but also on the resources available. Specically we assume that the action prole in a plot generates a strictly positive value f (a j t ) > 0 called free resources. This has for the moment no economic content, but we ask the reader to interpret it as a scalar measure of the ability to disrupt neighbors and avoid disruption; concrete specications of this function in terms of free resources is deferred to sections 5-7. What matters, however, in resolving conict are not merely free resources on a particular plot of land but rather the aggregate free resources available to a society.
For a non-isolated society x = 0 this is the sum of free resources belonging to the plots of that society
Note that if a society x is not present in a t then the corresponding aggregate free resources F are zero. Notice also that due to multiculturalism, a society's free resources depend non-trivially on a t because the admitted proles will have dierent free resources, and the total depends on how many of each kind there are.
Disruption, Expansionism and Free Resources
We are now in a position to state our three assumptions relating the disruption probability Π to free resources. The basic idea is that the more free resources a society has the more disruptive it is to its neighbors and the less likely it is to be disrupted by its neighbors. Moreover, non-expansionary societies are not disruptive to their neighbors. We capture these ideas through a number of specic assumptions.
The rst assumption is that comparing two societies, resistance to disruption is lower for the one with fewer free resources, and indeed resistance to disruption when there is an expansionary society with at least as many free resources is zero. Let E(x) denote whether x is expansionary or not, that is, E = 1 if x > 0, and E = 0 otherwise.
The rst part says that if two societies coexist in the sense that they are part of the same a t then the one with more free resources has at least the same resistance as the one with fewer free resources. The second part strengthens this to say that an expansionary society with at least as many free resources as a rival in fact has an appreciable chance of disrupting it. This rules out the possibility of there simultaneously being multiple expansionary societies for a substantial length of time, and enables us to use an analysis akin to Ellison [33] 's method of the radius. Without it, the analysis is more akin to his method of the co-radius, and we have neither been able to establish the result nor provide a counter-example in that case. The third part says that losing land does not increase resistance. 
where q is non-increasing and left continuous in the rst argument, q(0, E) = q(φ, 0) = 1 and there exists φ > 0 such that q(φ, 1) > 0.
In other words, resistance in the binary case depends monotonically on free resources and whether or not the rival society is expansionary. Moreover q(0, E) = 1
says that when the opponent has zero free resources resistance is at the highest possible level -recall that we have assumed that resistance is always bounded above by one. In addition q(φ, 0) = 1 asserts that a plot that is not expansionary always generates the same maximal resistance regardless of how many free resources it has available. Notice that the assumption q(0, E) = 1 applies to mutations -actions that are not currently being used. In this setup the chance of a mutation entering the population is the same (in resistance terms) for all mutations -the free resources associated with the mutant action prole become available for initiating or defending against disruption only after it enters the population -that is, the period after the mutation takes place. This follows from our assumption that the societies corresponding to action proles that are not currently in use have zero free resources.
The idea is that mutants need a period to get organized.
Observe that Assumption 3 implies thatφ = inf{φ|q(φ, 1) = 0} ≤ 1, since eventually if an expansionary society has enough free resources, it has an appreciable chance of disrupting a rival plot of land. Note that because r[q(φ, 1)] is left rather than right continuous we must use the inf here, and because we have assumed explicitly that there is some value of φ > 0 for which the resistance is strictly positive, we know thatφ > 0. Looking at what this means in terms of probability, we see that this zero up toφ after which it becomes strictly positive. That is, in the limiting case a suciently small society has no chance at all of disrupting a plot from a larger one.
The last assumption on Π states that disruption is not more likely when opponents are divided. Let Υ(a t ) denote all the societies in a t , that is the values of x = 0 in the range of χ plus the dierent values of a j t that correspond to isolated societies, that is with χ(a j t ) = 0.
14 Assumption 5. [Divided Opponents] If a t is binary,ã t has F (x, a t ) = F (x,ã t ) and
Dynamics and Stochastically Stable States
The dynamics of the stage game and of disruption together with the behavioral rules of the players induce a Markov process M ( , J) on the state space S dened in section 2.1. We are interested in this process, but primarily in the limit of this process as → 0. Proof. This follows from the fact that every combination of actions on every plot has positive probability.
We Let f (x) denote the least average per plot free resources in any of these states (or zero if S(x) is empty). It is obvious but useful to point out for later reference that this minimum is achieved when all plots play proles generating the least free resources. We say that x is a strongest expansionary society if f (x) = max x >0 f (x ).
Note by Assumption 2 and the assumption that free resources are strictly positive there is indeed at least one strongest expansionary society.
We can also extend the notion of a stochastically stable state to that of a stochas- of a monolithic expansionary society is measured by the Nash equilibrium consistent with belonging to that society which has the fewest free resources -the strength of a society is measured by its weakest member. Finally, among these incentive compatible expansionary arrangements it is having a weakest member with the most free resources that counts. Notice also that there may be non-expansionary societies with many more free resources than any expansionary society, or expansionary societies with incentive compatible arrangements with many more free resources than max x >0 f (x ). Never-the-less these societies are not stochastically stable and in the long-run will not be much observed.
It is worth indicating how the stochastically stable states relate to the dynamics of the Markov process for > 0. It is important to understand that the system does not in any sense converge asymptotically to the stochastically stable state.
Rather the expected length of time the system spends at that state is roughly proportional to 1/ raised to the power of the least resistance of leaving the state. 11
The system is genuinely random: disruptions can and do occur. Suppose the system is currently in a stochastically stable state. Sooner or later there will be enough unlucky coincidences to disrupt it and the system will uctuate randomly for some period of time as there is an appreciable probability that individuals will change their behavior. Eventually the system will settle down to some other steady state, not necessarily the stochastically stable one. However that steady state will also eventually be disrupted, more uctuations will occur, then another steady state will be reached. At some point another stochastically stable state will be reached. The key point is that the amount of time spent at steady states is high relative to the amount of time the system spends uctuating randomly, and the amount of time spent at the stochastically stable states is high relative to the amount of time spent during uctuations and at steady states that are not stochastically stable.
Dynamic considerations also explain why we can use a very weak notion of expansionism. We do not assume that a disrupted plot is conquered and absorbed by the disrupting society as an immediate consequence of disruption. Rather disruption itself is enough to result in conquest in the longer run. Once a plot is disrupted it nds itself in a non-quiet state and goes through a period of change until it is absorbed in a Nash state. But if when it does so it fails to join with its stronger expansionary neighbor, it will be disrupted again. This process will repeat until it is eventually absorbed by this neighbor. This is all that is required in the proof of the theorem. Consequently an important message from the theory is that in the long run it is not conquering power that counts, but stability in the sense of resistance to disruption.
Remark 4. (Relation to Literature on Group
Evolution) The novelty of our approach lies in the fact that we study group evolution as evolution of Nash equilibria. Ex-11 This is shown by Ellison [33] who refers to this least resistance as the radius of the state.
isting literature in the area mainly focuses on the interplay between individual and group evolutionary selection: individual behavior which increases tness of a group, typically some form of generosity, may be harmful for individual tness. This is the case both in the Haystack Model as in Maynard Smith [52] or Richerson and
Boyd [56] and in Bowles' model of conict and evolution (Bowles [21] ). The equilibrium dimension in the group selection literature is generally missing. One exception is 25 who consider a setting with multiple Evolutionary Stable Strategies and show that group selection can be operative at the level of the equilibrium.
In relation to this trade-o our result may be interpreted as saying that evolution, favoring expansionism, favors generosity, which may be seen as a necessary condition for expansionism; but also that given generosity, it favors large groups maximizing free resources, which are needed to survive competition between groups.
Social Norm Games and Free Resources
In generations of players as in Kandori [45] , for nite horizon games where the stage game has multiple Nash equilibria as in Benoit and Krishna [32] , and for one-shot self-referential games as in Levine and Pesendorfer [49] . As this literature is well developed we will adopt a simple two stage approach to get at the issues of the formation of societies and free resources.
We are given an arbitrary nite base game with strategy spacesÃ i and utility functionsũ i (ã j t ) ≥ 0, where the non-negativity of payos is a convenient normalization. These actions represent ordinary economic actions: production, consumption, reproduction decisions and so forth. We are also given a nite list O of integers representing dierent types of societies. We will detail the connection between these types of societies and the map χ(a j t ) after we describe the game itself.
We now dene a two stage game. In the rst stage each player chooses a base or I were to marry a child we had adopted we would probably be shunned. However to shun Woody Allen for this behavior is costly because he is an immensely talented lm-maker and because he has made the economic decision to devote a great deal of time and eort to lm-making. If he chose not to make lms it would be much less costly to shun him.
Notice that the second stage game is constructed to be a coordination game: in particular for any subset of players it is a Nash equilibrium for all players to shun exactly the players in that subset. These equilibria are not terribly robust -for example to the introduction of costs of shunning -but there are many more robustalbeit more complicated models -such as having an innite sequence of punishment rounds or or the self-referential model of Levine and Pesendorfer [49] . Since the robustness plays no role here for expositional simplicity we use the simple model of costless punishment.
Stage game strategies now consist of a triple ofã Notice that corresponding to the choices +1, −1 are many societies: those choices mean exactly those plots identical to me belong to my society so each action prole a j t represents a potentially dierent society. We wish to assign numerical indices to these dierent exclusive societies. To avoid conict with societies k ∈ O we do so Germans and follow German law, obey German police and so forth.
Perfect Observability
We begin with the simplest case to study, that of perfect observability where θ j t perfectly reveals the rst stage choices; we consider private information in section 6.
We assume that for allã by Theorem 5 the societyx(a j t ) has the greatest possible free resources and so is stochastically stable. This implies also that for large enough J any stochastically stable society must have this same amount of free resources.
Free Resources in a Malthusian Game
We now want to investigate free resources more closely. Expansion -and the While their can be many forms of strength as measured by free resources, in general in order to disrupt neighbors or defend against disruption it is generally important to have resources that are not being use for other purposes, hence free resources. We make this concrete rst through a simple Malthusian type of example in which players are families who choose the size of their families; we will elaborate on the example in the next subsection. Here we will contrast the Malthusian case where population size is chosen so that income per capita is at subsistence level with the case where it maximizes free resources, and explore how population and income per capita vary as technology improves.
We will model these economies as social norm games of perfect information, so there will be many Nash equilibrium population sizes: some large in which everyone is at the Malthusian level of subsistence, and others smaller in which output per 22 capita exceeds that needed to survive and reproduce. Notice that Malthus recognized that there can be incentive compatible social arrangements that stabilize the population at a low level. In real societies, long before the advent of birth control, population was controlled -largely, of course, by abstinence from intercourse. It is easy to imagine a stable social norm -a Nash equilibrium -that achieves this result:
women are limited to a certain number of children, and anyone who attempts to violate the norm is put to death along with her children. In practice societies often used methods not so dierent than this. Marriage was limited and delayed through requirements of substantial accumulation of capital or side-payments as a prerequisite to get married, and unwed mothers were severely punished, in many cases through capital punishment. This seems to be understood by demographic historians such as Bacci [9] , and as well as by Malthus himself -he simply thought that in some long-run evolutionary sense these low population equilibria were unstable.
We will argue the opposite. Specically, our intuition about free resources can be 13 This debate is primarily an eort to prove that prior to the industrial revolution everyone was at subsistence -the more elastic is the notion of subsistence this is easier to prove true.
14 Here we have in mind a more traditional 13 Historically, the subsistence level meant the physical requirements to survive and reproduce.
In the hands of modern economic historians such as Clark [28] subsistence has become an elastic concept meaning the some socially determined level of per capita income above which population decreases and below which it increases. From our earlier result on perfect information social norm games, we see that stochastic stability requires maximization of free resources. For simplicity suppose that aggregate output Y (z) is a dierentiable, strictly concave and strictly increasing function of population z. We will explore how the (unique since Y (z) is strictly concave) real value of z that maximizes free resources varies with the technological parameter α, and how income per capita goes; since the problem is concave, the optimal integer valued solution must be one of the adjoining grid points.
Recall for comparison the usual Malthusian case where population is so large that income per capita is at subsistence level, that is where the value of z that satises αY (z)/z = B. This value is strictly increasing in α and gives the usual Malthusian result: technological change in the long-run leaves per capita income unchanged and leads merely to an increase in population. In the case of maximization of free resources the situation is as follows: Proposition 3. The value of z * that maximizes free resources is strictly increasing in α. Per capita output increases with α if and only if
Proof. The value z * is dened implicitly by the equation αY (z) = B as a function of α. We want to compute the derivative of this function z and of αY (z)/z with respect to α. Of course the upper classes consume considerably more than subsistence so the mean must also be above subsistence. A typical example of this problem is in the classical and much cited Ladurie [47] study of Languedoc peasants in France. Ignored in this study are the facts that the nobles live above subsistence; that the entire area made substantial payments to the King -and indeed the ability of France to conduct continual wars throughout this period indicates that substantial free resources were available. More serious students of historical per capita GDP such as Maddison [50] point out the Malthusian bias implicit in conclusions of this type.
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in the statement.
Corollary 2. Let again z * be free resource maximizing, as a function of α. In the Cobb-Douglas case Y (z) = z β per capita output is independent of α. In the logarithmic case Y (z) = log(b + z), b > 0 per capita output is increasing for suciently large α, while for large enough b it is decreasing for small α and increasing for large α.
Proof. In the Cobb-Douglas case we have
so this case is completely neutral, just as in the Malthus case.
In the logarithmic case
in Proposition 3 can be simplied to
which is equivalent to log(b + z) < z/b because z ≥ 1. Now log(b + z) < log b + z/b for all z > 0, so the above inequality is satised for all z ≥ 1 if b ≤ 1. For b > 1 it is true for z large enough (the RHS goes to ∞ as z → ∞), so it is satised for big enough α. Of course there remains the question of whether we should imagine that technology is more like that of Cobb-Douglas or of the logarithmic form in population size. It seems compelling that only so many people can t on a particular plot of land before production becomes impossible due to overcrowding. In this case it is easy to see why per capita output must increase with technological improvement: once the upper bound on population is reached there is no point in adding more people regardless of the state of technology. The only way to take advantage of improved technology to get more free resources is through increased per capita output.
In other words, we expect that returns to population drops to zero as population grows. While we have not yet reached the unfortunate state of aairs in which production is impossible due to overcrowding, this argument does indicate some reason to think that returns to population diminish rather quickly as population on a plot of land grows. It suggests that the more rapidly decreasing returns of the logarithmic model may make more sense than the rather slowly decreasing returns of the Cobb-Douglas model. On the other hand, jewelry is not of much use in conict -a society armed with swords will quickly prevail over one armed with jewelry. Hence we take free resources to be f (ã
Technically there is not much to be learned from this formulation: free resources are maximized by choosing swords over jewelry and the population size as in the original Malthus example. Conceptually the point is this: the society that will be stochastically stable and most observed in the long-run will be the society that chooses swords over jewelry. This may appear to an observer to be dysfunctional in the sense that people like jewelry but not swords, and the choice of swords is enforced as a social norm through threat of shunning: do this stupid thing (choose 15 The mechanism here is not dissimilar to that discussed in Hansen and Prescott [41] : there it is the exhaustion of land that forces a change to a capital based technology that increases per capita income. 26 swords) or be shunned. Naturally the folk theorem allows many inecient equilibria of this type, and we generally as economists do not pay much attention to them.
But here the swords protect society from outside threats, so while inecient this equilibrium is very functional indeed.
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In general we think of free resources as a residual after necessary payments are made -this is the case in the original Malthus example and in our subsequent examples. In this sense free resource maximization is a lot like prot maximization and indeed our formal models have a strong similarity with models of prot maximization. Moreover, from an empirical standpoint, this connection may explain the historical importance of monarchies that can only be described as prot maximizing.
But as the jewelry and swords example makes clear, this connection is not perfect: the residual -prots if you will -may be turned to many uses and only some of these uses -swords not jewelry -constitute free resources. Hence a prot maximizing monarchy that through social norms is bound to use its prot for ghting and conict is the type we expect to survive: a prot maximizing monarchy that spends its prots and large and beautiful palaces has less of a future.
Private Information and Ineciency
Free resources are in a sense viewed here as a residual -what is left over after for use in conict. Subsistence needed to survive and reproduce cannot be diverted to conict. The same may also be said of incentive payments: if it is necessary to provide incentive payments to get output produced, these payments cannot be diverted to conict without also losing the output. In general the situation is complex:
an example similar to incentive payments is that documented by Weightman [60] who reports how British workers in the 19th century consumed roast beef. It was a luxury, but it made them stronger, better workers than on the continent where diet was poorer; so presumably it made them better soldiers as well. In general a diet above subsistence may increase free resources because it increases the ability of workers to produce output. However, like incentive payments, the payments that enable this improved diets are not part of free resources.
To get an idea how this works with incentive payments, we retain the setting of a social norm game, but now drop the assumption of perfect observability and 16 If jewelry that are consumed during peacetime may easily be given up and converted to swords in time of war then jewelry would be part of free resources.
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examine settings of private information where the folk theorem does not apply.
In this section we consider a hidden eort game which is a simple and relatively standard principal-agent type of model of eort provision.
The players in the hidden eort game are identical agents. Each agent chooses an eort level e ij t ∈ {0, 1} and as a consequence of this eort either observable output Y or no output is generated. The probability of output Y is π e . Privately observed eort increases the chance of output, that is π 1 > π 0 .
The plot of land as a whole must decide how to tax producers, or equivalently determine the amount W j t ≤ Y paid to each successful agent with the remaining output becoming free resources. This is done by a voting scheme: each agent votes for a wage rate W ij t ∈ Ω. Here Ω is a nite set, although as before to simplify computations we will later treat it as continuous -or at least assume that the grid includes the relevant values. We assume that there is a threshold N > N 3 > N/2 such that if this many or more agents agree on a wage rate the actual wage rate W j t is that rate, while the default if no agreement is reached is W j t = Y , that is, if there is no agreement on taxes there are no taxes.
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We assume that votes cast for participation in a particular society and votes on the payment scheme are perfectly observed. In summary,ã ij t = (e Players can be shunned in the second stage as a consequence of the output they produce in the rst stage and it will generally be desirable to do so even on the equilibrium path. Potentially this can interact with the use of shunning as a social sanction for perfectly observed voting behavior since it reduces the amount of additional shunning that can can be used as punishment. For this reason we now assume thatũ i (õ ij t ) = 0 so that there is no cost or benet of voting on a particular aggregation, so no need to provide incentives. In the case of voting on tax rates, we note that any tax rate is an equilibrium: if the vote is unanimous by the assumption that the threshold N 3 < N no single agent is decisive, so again no need to provide incentives.
With respect to the cost imposed by shunning we now make the symmetry assumption that Π i = Π. We continue to assume that shunning has no impact on free resources. Hence the the expected value of free resources generated by agent i
Notice that free resources here are essentially prot, so a free resource maximizing society will behave like a prot maximizing principal.
As we have noted any choice of societies and incentive scheme choices are equilibrium choices, so what matters is the incentive constraint that characterizes Nash equilibrium high eort. Letp ij t and P ij t denote the shunning probabilities if output is zero or Y respectively. Then the incentive constraint for high eort is
Our primary result compares the maximization of utility and free resources, with a view to eciency and shunning. 
Proof. To maximize expected utility −e provision. The point is that in the innovative environment punishment alone is not enough, we have to provide incentive payments resulting in informational rents to innovators, and these may be suciently high, that the increase in output is oset by the increased informational rents and it is better (from a free resource perspective) not to bother.
Theory of a Bureaucratic State
The maximization of free resources gives rise to a positive theory of government.
There are two widely used theories of government: one is the theory of the kleptocratic state widely prevalent in libertarian thought. In this view the government is a thief that has succeeded in establishing a monopoly over thievery. The more widespread view is that of a benevolent government that serves to provide public goods that are subject to severe free rider problems, and perhaps to provide greater allocational fairness. The maximization of free resources is an alternative to both of these views: here government provides a public good in the form of free resources, but the theory provides a denite objective for the government, with the provision of public goods other than free resources only occurring either because it increases free resources or because it is an unavoidable product of freeing resources. In some respects this theory is closest in spirit to Thompson and Hickson [59] 's theory of the vital organs of the state. In this section we examine a simple model of the bureaucratic state designed to explore these ideas.
We start by observing that bureaucracy is not present only in the public sector, but also among prot maximizing rms. IBM, a successful and 100 year old rm is renowned for its bureaucracy, for example. At the level of the government, we must remark on the enormous success of the Chinese bureaucratic system that persisted over 2 millennia from roughly the end of the warring states period in 221 BC to the communist take-over in 1949 AD. This system was widely imitated: even today in the United Kingdom senior civil servants are referred to as mandarins.
Our view is that bureaucracy is functional because it provides monitoring, enabling informational rents to be converted to prots (in the case of rms) or free resources (in the case of governments). So we examine a simple economy in which production (or endowments) are individually produced -but are private information to that individual.
In the mandarin game players choose an occupation c ij t ∈ {0, 1} where 1 corresponds to the choice of being a commissar and 0 corresponds to the choice of being a producer. A producer has a production technology that produces output Y > 0 with probability π and zero otherwise. If the producer has produced output he must choose whether or not to reveal that he produced output; we denote this choice by r ij t ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 corresponds to revealing the presence of output. A commissar audits κ ≥ 0 randomly chosen producers who have not revealed positive output and observes their production. Commissars also are enforcement specialists in the sense that they can physically seize any output that they nd. Let φ be the fraction of producers who have positive unrevealed output. If there are K j t commissars then for each producer the probability R j t that he is audited is equal to the (min between 1 and) the ratio of realized audits κK j t over those who report no output either because they have no output or because they have output and choose not to reveal it. Hence the probability R j t that a producer who does not reveal output is audited is
As in the hidden eort game we simplify by assuming that the subsistence level B = 0, that the shunning penalty is symmetric Π i = Π and thatũ i (õ 
Social sanctions -shunning with penalty value Π to be subtracted from utility -can be used for two purposes. First a producer who claims no output and is not audited can be sanctioned -we denote the probability of such a sanction as p ij t .
Second an individual who is designated to be a commissar and refuses to be such can be sanctioned. We denote the probability of such a sanction as q ij t .
To analyze equilibrium we rst observe that there is a kind of revelation principle:
to maximize free resources we can always do at least as well by getting producers to reveal. Conditional on having output, if the producer does not reveal he gets 
This means that if there are enough commissars (R j t ≥R) they can be paid zero, where enough is actually zero if the sanction Π is large enough compared to eective output (πY − 2Π ≤ 0).
while otherwise it is zero above the threshold
πY − 2Π/πY − Π. .
We are now ready to characterize equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Free resource maximizing equilibrium has optimal R j t given by
The fraction of commissars as a function of κ is given by
Note that κ measures eciency of bureaucracy, so the equilibrium calls for no bureaucracy if that is not ecient enough, then enough to have auditing probability equal to one. The κ threshold depends on π: the larger this is, that is the larger expected output, the lower the eciency threshold for using bureaucrats to audit producers. If π is very large so that most people produce output, then the number of innocent non-producers who must be audited in equilibrium is small so few commissars are needed. If π is very large so that very few people produce output, then many commissars are needed to hunt amongst the many innocent in an eort to nd someone guilty.
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The fact that the per capital number of commissars is non-monotone inκ = κ/(1 − π) deserves note. Whenκ is small there are no commissars -they are so inecient they subtract rather than add free resources. After the threshold Π/(Y −for the purposes of maximizing free resources or for any other goal. In our view, while free resource maximization provides a strong and useful tool for the study of the evolution of state institutions, a key missing ingredient -an adequate theory of collusion -is needed to have a proper theory of the state.
The issue of collusion is also relevant to another aspect of the example here. In this rather stylized world with constant returns to commissars there is a bang-bang feature: everyone is monitored or nobody. Of course if there is diminishing returns to commissars, for example because the most ecient bureaucrats are the rst to be appointed, then it may maximize free resources to have an intermediate level of monitoring. But the possibility of collusion may also be important here. As there are more commissars the size of the pie they control grows, and the temptation for someone to organize a collusive agreement in exchange for a fraction of the pie grows correspondingly.
Conclusion
Readers of grand theories of history such as those of McNeil [53] , Cipolla [27] , Diamond [30] or Acemoglu and Robinson [5] will not nd surprising the idea that ideas are spread by the conquest of the less advanced by the more advanced -indeed it seems almost ubiquitous in their anecdotes and discussions. Missing from these accounts, however, is the notion that it is free resources above and beyond subsistence and incentive payments that matter for the long-term success of societies.
In essence, the conclusion of our theory is that evolution favors large expansionary 
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Missing is also a explicit analysis of the role of institutions and their evolution with extraction of free resources in view. For example, Homan and Rosenthal [44] argue that the transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy in Europe was determined by the higher tax revenue to be employed for military purposes which a parliament could generate. Shaping of internal legislation also is linked to what we have called resistance: It is assumed in the paper that resistance to barbarian hordes is xed at 1, but in reality steps are often taken to minimize or prevent internal upheavals, see for example the case of electoral franchise discussed in Acemoglu and Robinson [4] .
On the other hand, there are a variety of historical episodes that may be interesting to explore through the lens of free resources. For example, at the beginning of the cold war, technology favored assembly line manufacturing which is relatively amenable to central planning, and so the Soviet Union, a system that excelled at appropriating a high fraction of resources as free, was able to compete successfully with the United States. By contrast as technology changed to favor greater decentralization, it is likely that the enormous growth of GDP in the United States relative to the Soviet Union made it impossible for the Soviet Union to continue to compete, despite its ability to appropriate a very high fraction of total resources.
In a similar way, the development of rearms at the end of the medieval period favored moderately skilled mass armies over small highly trained armies of specialists. Hence to generate large free resources, higher per capita income was needed.
The ultimate failure of poorly trained peasants to resist moderately trained lower 18 A recent empirical paper on the relation between warfare and institutions in the Italian Risorgimento is Dincecco, Federico and Vindigni [31] . 19 The wide range of (admittedly very primitive) social arrangements in New Guinea may be a case in point. middle class soldiers was seen in the early 20th Century in the defeat of Russia rst by Japan, and eventually by Germany which eectively ended the Russian Empire at the battle of Tannenberg.
We should acknowledge also that while conict is an important force in the spread (and disruption) of institutions and ideas, voluntary movement of the type discuss by Ely [34] exists as well and provides a force away from free resource maximization and towards eciency. This suggests a more rened theory in which both free resources and eciency matter, with the relative strengths of the two depending on the relative importance of ideas spreading through conquest versus voluntary movement.
In summary, the notion of evolution through contacts and conicts between soci- Proof. First we observe that the s t as described are absorbing states of the Markov chain, hence certainly in S[0, J]. This is trivial, since by assumption no disruption is possible at these states. To prove the theorem it is sucient to show that from any other initial condition there is a positive probability of reaching one of these absorbing states. This rules out existence of other ergodic classes.
We show that one of these absorbing states has positive probability of being reached from any initial condition. First notice that there is a positive probability that for T + L + 1 periods no plot is disrupted. During such a period a quiet plot remains quiet. In a plot j in which some player is not quiet there is a positive probability that all players on that plot will not be quiet the following period. There is then a positive probability that for the next T + L periods all players will play a steady state Nash equilibrium prole and the plot will become quiet. Since this is true of all plots and there are nitely many of them, there is a positive probability that after T + L + 1 periods the state will be a Nash state.
Suppose we begin in a Nash state which is not one of the described absorbing states. Then there is some expansionary society x that has the most free resources among all expansionary societies that are present in that state (there may be more than one such). If there is more than one expansionary society, one of them has free resources relative to some other of at least 1, and hence by Assumption 3 it has positive probability of becoming the sole expansionary society. Hence multiple expansionary societies are transitory.
If there is no other expansionary society, by assumption one of them has positive probability of being disrupted. Subsequently the disrupted plot has positive probability of joining society x and so there is positive probability of moving to a steady state Nash equilibrium where x has one more plot. By the second part of Assumption 3 we can repeat the process (still with positive probability) until the absorbing state in which J(x) = J is reached.
To prove the main theorem we will now apply a method of Friedlin and Wentzell [36] described in Young [61] to analyze the case > 0 and the limit as → 0. We use the characterization of stochastically stable states given by Young [61] . Let T be a tree whose nodes are the set S[0, J] with any set of edges. We denote by D(s) the unique node from s in the direction of the root. An s-tree is a tree whose root is s, denoted T (s). For any two points s 0 , s t ∈ S[0, J] we dene the resistance as follows.
First, a path from s 0 to s t is a sequence of points s 0 , . . . , s t ∈ S, where the transition from s τ to s τ +1 has positive probability for > 0. The resistance of the path is the sum of resistances between points in the path
The resistance r(s 0 , s t ) is the least resistance of any path from s 0 to s t . The resistance r(T (s t )) of the s t -tree T (s t ) is the sum over non-root nodes s τ of r(s τ , D(s τ )): r(T (s t )) = sτ ∈S[0,J]\st r(s τ , D(s τ )). Finally, the resistance r(s t ) is the least resistance of all the s t -trees. The following Theorem is proved in Young [61] . For each expansionary society x for which the corresponding set of monolithic states S(x) is nonempty pick an s t ∈ S(x) and dene l(s t ) ≡ mins t∈S(x) lr(s t , S[0, J]\S(x)) -the minimum least resistance to pass from a state in S(x) to one outside of it; for the remaining states (if any) s t ∈ S(x) dene l(s t ) ≡ mins t∈S(x) lr(s t , S[0, J]) -the minimum least resistance to go from a state in S(x) to any state in S[0, J], which in fact is always 1. For states s t which belong to no S(x) dene l(s t ) ≡ lr(s t , S[0, J]).
, that is the sum of all the l(s τ )'s except the highest. Lemma 2. Any s t -tree T (s t ) satises r(T (s t )) ≥ ml.
For the sake of clarity we observe that if no state belonged to an S(x) the lemma would be trivial, because r(T (s t )) = sτ ∈S[0,J]\st r(s τ , D(s τ )) and by construction r(s τ , D(s τ )) ≥ min s∈S[0,J] r(s τ , s) = lr(s t , S[0, J]) = l(s τ ) so r(T (s t )) ≥ sτ ∈S[0,J]\st l(s τ ), which is the sum of all the l(s τ )'s except l(s t ); so either l(s t ) is highest and then the sum is ml by denition, or l(s t ) is not highest and then the sum is larger than ml (because it has the highest term in and leaves out a smaller one).
A slight complication arises because for the selected element s t in the non-empty S(x) we have dened l(s t ) to be a number possibly larger than min s∈S[0,J] r(s t , s) (for reasons which will be clear in the proof of the main result). To this we turn in the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma. For any s t -tree T (s t ) we have r(T (s t )) = sτ ∈S[0,J]\st r(s τ , D(s τ )). By construction it is r(s τ , D(s τ )) ≥ l(s τ ) for all s τ except possibly for the designated states in the non-empty S(x)'s in case the transition (s τ , D(s τ )) on the tree takes place inside their S(x). Consider then such a designated state s * . If its S(x) contains also the root s t then it must be r(s * , D(s * )) ≥ l(s t ) and then we get r(T (s t )) ≥ sτ ∈S[0,J]\s * l(s τ ) which is no smaller than ml because the latter leaves out the highest term. If on the other hand the S(x) containing s * does not contain the root s t then for some s τ ∈ S(x) the transition (s τ , D(s τ )) must take s τ out of S(x); then from r(s τ , D(s τ )) ≥ l(s * ) and r(s * , D(s * )) ≥ l(s τ ) we get r(s τ , D(s τ )) + r(s * , D(s * )) ≥ l(s τ ) + l(s * ), which again implies the inequality in the statement.
The bound established in the Lemma is not generally a useful one, but in the current setting we shall show that there is a tree that achieves this bound. Such a tree is necessarily a least resistance tree.
The central theorem of the paper, Theorem 3 in text, itself has two parts, which we cover in the next result and the corollary which follows. We recall that a stochastically stable society is one for which all the corresponding monolithic states S(x) are stochastically stable; and that a strongest expansionary society is one whose minimum free resources among the admitted proles (weakest link of chain) is highest.
Theorem 5. If x is a strongest expansionary society then it is stochastically stable.
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Proof. Recall that in the least (average per plot) free resource states in a society, in particular in a strongest expansionary society x, the proles played in all plots must have the same free resources. In some such states the proles may be dierent from one another in the society's plots, but in others all plots play the same least free resource prole. Such states we consider rst: we show that for some such s t (x) ∈ S(x) it is possible to build a tree T (s t (x)) such that r(T (s t (x))) = ml. This achieves the lower bound by Lemma 2, so must be a least resistance tree. Then we show how to rearrange this tree without increasing the cost so that any state s t ∈ S(x) is the root. l(s τ ).
We start with the non-expansionary states. For such an s τ the least cost l(s τ ) is established by a single plot of land being disrupted to any Nash state for that plot:
this has a resistance of 1, the least possible resistance of any transition from a nonexpansionary state. In particular, we may connect the non-expansionary state to the state in which the lowest numbered plot of land is disrupted to an expansionary prole X. Hence, since X is by construction expansionary, each non-expansionary state is connected at least cost to a mixed state.
For mixed states, a least cost transition is for a non-expansionary society to have a single plot disrupted -to any particular target. The transition has resistance no greater than 1. Among the plots in non-expansionary societies that have the greatest chance of disruption suppose that the lowest numbered plot is disrupted to the prole of the highest numbered plot of the expansionary society. Notice that this process cannot result in a cycle, since the number of plots owned by the expansionary society increases by one at each step. In this way, each mixed state is connected by a sequence of least cost transitions to a state in a monolithic expansionary state.
This reduces the problem to sub-trees on the states corresponding to the expansionary societies y.
For each expansionary society y x a least resistance prole Y ∈ χ −1 (y). First we deal with s t ∈ S(y) where not all plots are playing the given least resistance prole Y . For these states disrupting the lowest numbered plot of land in which the state is not Y to the state Y has a cost of 1 which is the least possible, since societies to not have conict within themselves.
Finally we consider, for any y, the unique state s t (y) ∈ S(y) where all plots play Y . We will show that there is a path from s t (y) to any s t (z) where z = y that achieves mins t∈S(y) lr(s t , S[0, J]\S(y)). We designate s t (x) as the root of our proposed tree, and for y = x we take z = x, that is these other minimal free resource monolithic expansionary states should go directly to the root.
It is convenient to illustrate the least cost path from s t (y) to s t (z) by means of 
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Notice that when a Y is replaced by a Z the most possible free resources of an opponent A face the least possible free resources of any society of the given size in S(y). Notice second that going down a column, until the nal stage we alternate AZAZ.... Since L ≥ 2 this assures that the plot is never quiet, and so all transitions on that plot have 0 resistance: the only costly resistance is when a plot Y is converted to Z, which has resistance 1. In the nal stage, we hold what happens xed with all plots playing Z which is by assumption a Nash equilibrium, and the transitions have no cost, so there should be L nal transitions after which all the plots become quiet and the state s t (z) is achieved. Thus we have shown that for any S(y) we have st∈S(y) r(s τ , D(s τ )) = st∈S(y) l(s τ ) on the tree. The construction also shows that s t (x) achieves max sτ ∈S[0,J] l(s τ ) which since it is the root is discarded; hence for the tree just described we have r(T (s t )) = ml which is what was to be shown.
Finally, we show how to rearrange the tree so that any s t ∈ S(x) is at the root, without increasing resistance. This is relatively trivial, since if we put s t at the root, and connect the remaining s τ ∈ S(x) to the root sequentially by replacing the prole on each plot by the corresponding element of s t the cost of all these transitions is 1 exactly as in the tree T (s t (x)).
Corollary 3. For J large enough every stochastically stable state s t ∈ S(x) for some strongest expansionary society x.
Proof. It follows from the proof of Theorem 5 that if s t is the root of a least resistance tree, the lower bound must be achieved, and this is possible only if l(s t ) = max st∈S[0,J] l(s t ). We rst show that for large J monolithic states have l(s t ) > 1, hence (since the other states have have l(s t ) ≤ 1) only they can be stochastically stable. The claim l(s t ) > 1 amounts to asserting that for large J resistance of a monolithic state x to disruption by a barbarian horde x is positive for at least the rst two plots; but as J grows large 2/J → 0, so (using the last limit in Assumption 4) the ratio of free resources φ = F (x , a t , ω t )/F (x, a t , ω t ) → 0, and for small φ resistance is positive by assumption.
Finally observe that the possibility that a society x with f (x) < max x >0 f (x ) can have l(s t ) = max st∈S[0,J] l(s t ) only because of the round-o error caused by the discrete size of the plots (which makes the barbarian horde jump above the threshold φ in a certain number of steps); but as J grows large this error goes to zero because each conquered plot makes φ move less. From this the result follows.
